European organizations and minority rights in Europe: on transforming the securitization dynamic by Galbreath, David J & McEvoy, Joanne
        
Citation for published version:
Galbreath, DJ & McEvoy, J 2012, 'European organizations and minority rights in Europe: on transforming the











Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. May. 2019
1 
 
European Organizations and Minority Rights in Europe: On 
Transforming the Securitization Dynamic 
 
Introduction 
Europe has done more than any other continent in protecting the rights of minorities. 
For some, this is not surprising. In living memory, Europe has witnessed two 
devastating wars which killed a total of 50 million people that were both the result of 
ethno-nationalist tendencies. Furthermore, following the end of the Cold War, Europe 
witnessed several occurrences of major ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia 
(Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo) and Soviet Union (Moldova, Azerbaijan, 
and Georgia). The result left many dead, a region wondering how this could have 
happened (again), and attempts to prevent such conflict from happening again. At the 
same time, Europe is being transformed. The European Union (EU) enlarged to the 
East (and South) in 2004 and 2007 taking in parts of the old Soviet bloc and even part 
of the former Soviet Union (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). During this process of 
enlargement, minority rights protection was put forward by the three European 
organizations (European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
and the Council of Europe) as a means to secure regional security, democratization 
and the future of European integration. In other words, the focus on minorities in the 
post-Cold War period has brought forward a complex network of international 
organizations, states and minorities to complete what we refer to as the ‘European 
minority rights regime’. 
 However, this raises a serious question of how effective this regime has been 
in Central and Eastern Europe. Exploring this question of regime effectiveness in 
more detail elsewhere (Galbreath and McEvoy 2012), our primary aim here is to 
examine the aims and outcomes of European organizations’ focus on minority rights 
in Europe. With this in mind, we identify three empirical observations that inform our 
argument. The first is that by and large acceding states sought to do as little possible 
to meet the requirements of the European minority rights regime. This is to say that 
states, who were repositioning society following the collapse of socialist governments 
had little intention to alter what for most were state-building programmes and again 
for others nation-building programmes. Second, European organizations were limited 
in their norms and implementation mechanisms. This limitation was due to the state 
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centric nature of European organisations specifically and international relations in 
general. Arguably the least state-centric organization, the EU, was in fact the weakest 
in terms of voice and mechanisms in which to condition minority rights in Europe. 
Furthermore, the European minority rights regime is predicated on an individual 
notion of rights, which has been constructed to mean not group rights. Finally, and 
following from the first two points, European organizations have opted for a 
protection logic rather than an empowering logic when dealing with minorities. 
 These empirical findings lead us to argue three points. We argue that the 
European minority rights regime; 
a) is not asking how can it improve the role of minorities in Europe but instead is 
asking how it can reduce the change of regional instability; promotes minority 
protection to reduce regional instability, rather than to improve minority rights 
per se 
b) tries to ‘satisfice’ rather than maximise the role of minorities in European 
political communities; and 
c) pushes protection over empowerment as a solution to the ‘minorities’ problem 
in Europe. 
As a result, we argue that this very character of the European minority rights regime 
reduces its ability to promote the desecuritization of societal relations in multicultural 
Europe. As a result, European organisations have not only been unable to desecuritize 
majority-minority relations but have even contributed to the securitised construction 
of minorities contrary to the international organizations’ claims and arguable goals. 
In this article, we look at the securitization literature and the claim that 
societal security is ‘impossible’ to desecuritize. We examine to what degree the 
European minority rights regime has led to a desecuritization and asecuritization of 
the issues around national minorities in Europe. We then demonstrate, via an analysis 
of the three organizations, how their ability to transform interethnic relations is 
shaped by three factors: narratives, norms and ‘nannies’. By narratives, we mean 
those underlying logics of intervention. By norms, we mean the institutional 
conceptualisations of minority rights. Finally, by ‘nannies’ we reflect on the 




The Logics of Securitization and Protection 
We lead with a securitization approach for two reasons. The first is that as the Cold 
War began to falter, ethnic identities became more salient and in many cases 
securitized domestically (see Tilly 1991; Lake and Rothchild 1996; Tishkov 1997). 
Put differently, minorities were considered ‘asecuritised’, or outside what Barry 
Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, refer to as 'emergency politics' (1998). This 
fits with how Jennifer Jackson-Preece (1997) describes the rise and fall of minority 
rights in international relations. In particular, she argues that minority rights will 
become more salient as borders change and this fits with the history of the former 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Second, European organizations used the enlargement 
process to condition minority rights first and foremost as a way to ensure regional 
stability (Malloy 2005). Thus, the conditionality logic was to desecuritise what had 
been securitised with the collapse of the Cold War (and more importantly its 
antecedents). In sum, we see a process of societal securitization at the domestic level 
and an attempt at desecuritization at the regional level. Our argument is that despite 
the goals of European organisations, they cannot provide mechanisms for 
desecuritization when their very approach of protection is static rather than dynamic 
understanding of the state-minority relationship. To substantiate this claim, we need 
to delve further into the securitization literature.   
European organizations see themselves as having an important role to play in 
reducing the likelihood of conflict between ethnic groups, or in other words 
desecuritizing minority rights. In fact, all of the inter-governmental organizations of 
Europe have institutionalised ways of reducing the chance of conflict since the end of 
the Cold War. Located in the securitization literature, some authors attempt to 
conceptualise the securitization phenomenon in relation to minorities, building on Jeff 
Huysmans (2000) work on the EU and migrants. In particular, Paul Roe examines the 
conditions for desecuritization at the domestic level, assuming that a national 
reconciliation in order for a peace ‘to stick’. He argues that considering the different 
sectors of security as established by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, ethnic or religious 
insecurity (societal security) causes the most problem for the possibility of 
desecuritization. This problem lies within the very nature of inter-communal security 
in that it is based on the security of a group rather than an individual. ‘In other words, 
over and above all other principles, it is the maintenance of group identity that 
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underpins the provision of minority rights’ (Roe 2004: 288). The position of a 
minority is well illustrated by Roe as he contrasts minorities with migrants: 
 
The potential fluidity of the individual migrant’s identity provides a possible 
escape route from the constraints of the us–them dichotomy. In the context of 
minority rights, however, the necessity on the part of the minority (and indeed 
also the majority) for group distinctiveness necessarily blocks this same way 
out: the language of the individual is subordinated to the language of the 
collective. In other words, how is it possible to securitize through identity 
deconstruction when both minorities and majorities often strive for the 
reification of distinct collectivities (2004: 290)? 
 
Based on this, Roe’s finding suggests that it is ‘impossible’ to desecuritize minority 
rights. However, Roe has not taken into consideration the impact of enlargement and 
conditionality on societal security in Central and Eastern Europe, although his 
findings in no way preclude the role of other actors outside the domestic context. We 
seek to elaborate more fully on this impact. 
 If securitization is moving an issue from ‘normal politics’ to ‘emergency 
politics’, then desecuritization should be moving an issue in the opposite direction. In 
the literature on desecuritization, the focus is on domestic attempts to desecuritize an 
issue. Jef Huysmans establishes three such processes that he refers to as the 
'objectivist strategy', 'constructive strategy’, and the ‘deconstructivist strategy’ 
(Huysmans 1995). First, the 'objectivist strategy' set out to set the record straight 
assuming that there is an objective account of whether the issue is a threat. Second, 
the 'constructive strategy' avoids handling the situation or doing something about the 
securitization of an issue and instead seeks to understand how the issue has come to 
be securitised. In this way, 'handlers' are more aware of how to go about stepping 
back from the 'limit' (see Huysmans 1998). Finally, the 'deconstructivist strategy' 
attempts to take part in the image of the issue as a threat. In our case, this would mean 
situating a group identity within a larger multicultural context or situating individual 
identities with a more complex conglomerate context (e.g ethnic-local-nation-
regional). 
 The strategies are important because they offer a way towards reversing or 
eliminating the securitization of societal identities. Roe’s critique though is that 
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because often ethnic conflict is socially all encompassing, it leaves nothing else but a 
zero-sum result: ‘either with us or against us’. Any attempt to reduce the ethnic 
capital of one set of identities naturally benefits the other. The problem then becomes 
the zero-sum game between or among groups. How do we transform a zero-sum game 
that pits two groups one another without escape to a positive-sum game, where groups 
see mutual progress through mutual change? This is easier said than done. 
Domestically, what room is there for alternative social narratives to arise when ethnic 
relations have been securitized? The answer is often unsatisfactory and unsustainable, 
such as conflict fatigue after years of inter-communal violence. The answer may lie 
beyond the state. 
Matti Jutila argues that through a ‘reconstructivist’ approach, the 
‘desecuritization of minority rights is always logically possible, though in some cases 
it might be practically impossible’ (2006, 169). Jutila argues that his ‘reconstructivist’ 
strategy is more akin to Huysmans’s constructivist strategy, where here we have 
argued that it has to be coupled with a process of ‘deconstruction’. The process 
involves shifting to ‘one of the components that makes securitization possible: 
exclusive narratives of identities and political communities’ (2006, 179). Jutila 
stresses what we have stressed here and elsewhere, that the state-minority dichotomy 
too easily promotes identities that cannot coexist in the same political community (e.g 
can one be both Hungarian and Slovakian?). And for a long period, no solution would 
have seemed appropriate. The age of religious conflict in Europe for instance was a 
time for drawing boundaries between denominational states (France goes to 
Catholicism while Britain goes to Protestantism) while ethnic conflict produced the 
large-scale population movements of the twentieth century, the largest the world had 
ever seen. We are no longer in a world where this is deemed acceptable. The minority 
rights discourse must set alongside a Westphalian states’-rights discourse. Herein lies 
the challenge of the European minority right regime. 
If a European narrative can be informed by multiculturalist principles (i.e. 
coexisting identities in the same political community), then we should expect a 
possibility where European organisations can promote the processes of deconstruction 
and reconstruction. In many cases, national minorities are Europeans themselves and 
thus fit well within the image of a larger European political community. The closer 
we get to the border of Europe, even subjectively defined, the greater problem there is 
in incorporating minority groups and this European political community. Such a 
6 
 
situation faces European countries with large North African and Asian minority 
communities. 
 The point is that a reasonable argument can be made to suggest that because 
domestic politics cannot escape the ‘us-them’ dichotomy, a regional organization may 
provide an alternative narrative that moves it. Paul Roe (2004) argues that minority 
rights cannot be desecuritized because reaffirming the rights of one group 
automatically threatens the other group. Thus, at the domestic level or at least 
between two opposing ethnic or linguistic groups, it is impossible to desecuritize what 
has already been securitised without a change in the way that society is structured. 
Yet any attempt to restructure society will be seen as a threat to either group’s 
existence. Added to this is that minority rights are predicated on preserving the 
identity of the minority group. In this way, European organisations may be able to 
influence the structure of society in a way that preserves group identities by 
incorporating them within a larger political framework.  
 The impact of EU enlargement has been covered comprehensively elsewhere. 
Those who talk to the power of enlargement and conditionality argue that through the 
material and ideational benefits of enlargement, acceding states were able to change 
their polices in relation to their minorities to decrease the likelihood of ethnic conflict 
(Radaelli 1999; Sjursen 2002; Schimmelfennig 2002; Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2004; Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel 2005). This ‘Europeanization’ 
argument suggests that either through material conditionality, rhetorical 
argumentation, or socialization, things have improved for the better, or at least that 
policy change has occurred. Although policies have arguably improved in some 
states, it is the nature and to the degree of positive change in which we are interested. 
Others argue that enlargement had little to no effect on minority rights (Hughes and 
Gwedolyn Sasse 2003; Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse, and Gordon 2004; Gwendolyn 
Sasse 2008). This argument might suggest that a) European organizations were 
interested in minorities for show and b) acceding-states knew it. Still others have 
argued that European integration has had the potential to either alleviate or enhance 
tension over minorities (see Galbreath and McEvoy 2010).  
 Nevertheless, we may assume that European organizations seek to alter the 
securitized nature of state-minority relations, which fits between the two integration 
arguments and as suggested fits our findings elsewhere. Second, we can rely on 
Huysmans’s ‘de-constructivist’ approach to suggest that if the domestic setting cannot 
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escape the ‘us-them’ dichotomy, then the regional integration process should promote 
a deconstruction of this stand-off and ‘reconstruct’ an alternative domestic-cum-
regional narrative. This ‘Europeanization’ logic suggests that the EU would be the 
best placed organisation to provide a solution. Along these lines, we expect that of the 
security, democracy and integration approaches, the latter should be the most 
powerful in its ‘reconstruction’ potential.  
 From this discussion, we can devise a conceptual framework that can evaluate 
the desecuritization attempts made by Europe’s international organisations. We seek 
to explore how Jutila’s ‘reconstructivist’ approach to societal security can be 
operationalized by the OSCE, Council of Europe, and EU, keeping in mind the limits 
to their approaches to minority rights stated in the introduction. This review of the 
desecuritisation literature suggests that those organizations who seek to address the 
underlying societal tensions and the ethnic or national identities that underpin them 
will be most successful in reducing the possibilities of ‘emergency politics’. We also 
suggest that those international actors who can provide a ‘reconstructed’ communal 
narrative without threatening the existential nature of societal identities will prove to 
be more effective at reducing tensions. In other words, we seek to map Huysman’s 
‘contructivist’ approach and Jutila’s ‘reconstructivist’ on to our three institutional 
case studies.  
 Such an approach requires qualifications and clarifications. The first is that we 
are not claiming that organisation’s themselves have internalised these approaches. In 
fact, the reality is quite the unrelated given that attention to minorities has often been 
given through the alternative narratives of regional stability, liberalisation and 
integration. Nevertheless, we make the central argument that international 
organisations can play an important role in the desecuritization of societal tensions 
and those who are best able to emphasise ‘empowerment’ over ‘protection’ will be 
able to go the furthest in terms of ‘reconstructing’ societal relations. In this way, the 
three identified narratives tell us something about the projects to which these 
organisations are committed vis-à-vis national minorities. All of this considered, we 
operationalize this approach in three ways: 
1. Narrative: to what extent does a regional narrative influence a party’s 
approach to desecuritization? 
2. Norms: to what extent do the norms of the European minority rights regime 
provide for a transformative path to desecuritization? 
8 
 
3. ‘Nannies’: to what extent does institutionalised approaches to minorities 
balance between ‘protection’ and ‘empowerment’? 
The following sections highlight these three factors of desecuritization by 
international organisations. 
 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
Narrative  
The OSCE is the one European organization that has attempted to deal with minority 
rights from an explicit security position (see Cronin 2002; Galbreath 2007: 50-2). As 
the collapse of the Soviet bloc continued, the CSCE began to reconsider the possible 
threats to security in the region. In 1990 both the Copenhagen Document and the 
Charter for Paris addressed the importance for the treatment of national minorities. 
Importantly, the latter further developed the ‘human dimension’ first expressed in the 
1975 Final Act. The following year the 1991 Geneva Meeting of Experts on National 
Minorities concentrated the OSCE’s efforts to tie security to democratization in the 
region. By this time, instability in the former Yugoslavia was causing serious 
anxieties in Europe. Section II of the Meeting of Experts states that  
 
[the participating states] emphasize that human rights and fundamental 
freedoms are the basis for the protection and promotion of rights of persons 
belonging to national minorities. They further recognize that questions 
relating to national minorities can only be satisfactorily resolved in a 
democratic political framework based on the rule of law, with a functioning 
independent judiciary. This framework guarantees full respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, equal rights and status for all citizens, 
including persons belonging to national minorities, the free expression of all 
their legitimate interests and aspirations, political pluralism, social tolerance 
and the implementation of legal rules that place effective restraints on the 




This statement suggests that the OSCE saw the primary source of violation coming, 
not from simply another ethnic group, but rather from the state itself. The most 
                                            
1
 http://www.osce.org/hcnm/14588. Emphasis added (Date Accessed: 13 May 2011). 
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important consequence of the Geneva Meeting of Experts on National Minorities is 
the emphasis on creating instruments which can investigate, negotiate and recommend 
in cases where the rights of national minorities are perhaps under strain. In this case, 
we see the OSCE developing tools to desecuritize societal security. 
 From this emphasis, the 1992 Helsinki Document went on to create the OSCE 
High Commissioner on National Minorities (High Commissioner or HCNM). The 
1996 Lisbon Document went even further in specifying the role of the office. The 
High Commissioner is the most advanced instrument for dealing with national 
minority issues (Kemp 2001; Zellner 1999). The HCNM has several roles based on 
observation, negotiation and recommendation. Combined with the OSCE field 
missions, the High Commissioner is an instrument for investigating potential hotspots 
before they become flash points. Second, the High Commissioner’s work is also about 
bringing together parties to a common forum in which to discuss their grievances, as 
has happened in Romania in relation to the Hungarian minority. Finally, the HCNM 
offers recommendations based on international and European standards of minority 
rights and democracy, such as the Council of Europe’s 1950 European Convention 
and Framework Convention on National Minorities. This approach to minorities 
indicates that the OSCE is not only about desecuritizing minorities, but is also aimed 
at ‘asecuritizing’ minorities. In other words, the OSCE’s remit includes helping to 
avoid a move from ‘normal’ to ‘emergency’ politics.  
 
Norms 
The OSCE also goes further than an explicit security agenda. While it has 
often been documented that there is no definition of national minorities in 
international or even European law, High Commissioner Max van der Stoel did go 
some way in trying to define the standards by which the ‘protection’ of national 
minorities should be judged. The High Commissioner sponsored several meetings of 
minority rights experts from the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations in the 1990s to 
formulate specific criteria. Three such documents came out of the OSCE sponsored 
meetings. The first was the 1996 Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education 
Rights of National Minorities. The Hague Recommendations stress the need for 
mutual bilingualism in society. In theory, bilingualism should encourage empathy and 
reciprocity which in turn would lead to confidence-building among the groups. 
Bilingualism would also be a safe way of precluding forced or unforced assimilation. 
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Second, the 1998 Oslo Recommendations Regarding the Linguistic Rights of National 
Minorities go beyond educational needs to focus on the role of language in the public 
sphere. Much of what is in the Oslo Recommendations can also be found in the 
Council of Europe’s FCNM, including the use of minority languages in areas where 
that group may predominate. The final document is the 1999 Lund Recommendations 
on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life. The Lund 
Recommendations go beyond protection, for which Jackson Preece (1997: 345-346) 
criticised the Helsinki Final Act, to the facilitation of improved state-minority 
relations. The High Commissioner and the Foundation for Inter-Ethnic Relations 
reformulated an undefined concept and rather vague notion of protection with these 
three documents. The Hague Recommendations are particularly important because 
they speak of the rights of children. The Oslo Recommendations are important as far 
they concern a minority group’s position within their own community. The Lund 
Recommendations go beyond stating the parameters of protection to encouraging the 
facilitation of minority views in political discourse. Finally, the 2008 Bolzano/Bozen 
Recommendations on National Minorities and Inter-State Relations look at the impact 
of national minorities on host-state – kin-state relations. The latter recommendations 
arguably illustrate a focus on the security agenda for the OSCE as well as the ‘core’ 





How does the OSCE seek to desecuritize societal relations? Three characteristics are 
important in describing the OSCE and its relations with national minorities. The first 
and foremost is the fact that the HCNM is devoted solely to areas of potential 
conflicts. For this reason, van der Stoel and those who have held his office since have 
looked into societal relations in places like Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia and the Crimea, 
but have largely ignored Bulgaria, Poland, Lithuania, and Moldova not to mention 
Turkey or even the Romani throughout Europe. As HCNM, Rolf Ekeus stressed the 
fact that the OSCE was a security organisation, not a rights organization, despite the 
fact that the Helsinki Final Act and the CSCE Meetings on the Human Dimension 
strictly connect security and rights.
3
  
                                            
2
 For the six OSCE HCNM thematic recommendations see http://www.osce.org/hcnm/66209 (accessed 
11 May 2011) 
3
 Interview with the author, 31 March 2006, The Hague. 
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As an ‘early warning’ mechanism, the HCNM was designed to prevent ethnic 
conflict but its ability to be a transformative institution is simply limited by its very 
mandate. The HCNM cannot even bring itself to talk about ‘protection’ and is quick 
to point out that its office is ‘on’ minorities rather than ‘for’ them. In other words, the 
OSCE most often acts as a ‘deconstructivist’ actor in societal disputes. For instance, 
during the ‘Alien’s Crisis’ in Estonia in 1993, van der Stoel was quick to visit 
Estonia, talking to all sides, and ‘name and shame’ but the government and the 
minority community but the overall impact on Estonian-Russian-speaker relations 
was negligible, to be generous (see Galbreath 2005: 243-244). Here, we would even 
go further and suggest that the HCNM role in societal security often appears to 
maintain the status-quo state vs. minority logic of the European minority rights 
regime. The practical result of this approach is the concentration on state integration 
programmes which take no account of the zero-sum context of the interethnic 
relations in ‘emergency politics’. In sum, the OSCE is unable to transform this zero-
sum context. Rather it attempts to deconstruct societal security and the results 
reaffirm Roe’s argument of intransigence. 
Why doesn't the OSCE do more to solve societal insecurities? The answer is 
three-fold. Firstly, the HCNM is working to its mandate as an early warning and 
conflict prevention mechanism. The fact that the office under several High 
Commissioners has been able to move the normative base of minority rights 
protection forward through its recommendations and guidelines says something to 
how the HCNM tends to rub at the edges of its mandate. Secondly, the OSCE and 
therefore the HCNM simply does not have the political power of persuasion to run 
counter to the guiding norms of state-centred politics. The fact that the HCNM exists 
at all as the only political institution aimed at addressing national minorities in the 
world tells us about opportunities and constraints on such an institution. Finally, the 
OSCE as a whole is not a transformative institution but rather is a ‘confidence and 
security building’ institution and it does this through maintaining the status quo 




Council of Europe  
Narrative 
As we set out in the beginning, minority rights have been set within the context of 
three narratives: security, democracy, and regional integration. Having explored 
security as a narrative and demonstrated its complicated relationship with minority 
rights, we turn our attention to democracy. In terms of democracy, we refer to two sub 
narratives that are rights-based arguments for minority rights and the role of 
institutions in protecting minority rights. The first argument set out that minority 
rights is an intricate part of a broader human rights platform. Thus, individuals should 
have the right to identify with different ethno-cultural groups and practice as part of 
these groups. In practical terms, this means speaking one's own language, having 
children learn their own language, and enjoying cultural rights in both the private and 
public spheres. - Such a right is set out in the UN’s Article 27 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states that 
 
‘In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, 
to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.’ 
 
Yet the tension between group and individual rights as discussed previously 
makes the focus on minority rights more problematic. As Kymlicka (1995: 35) points 
out, minority groups are likely to make two types of claims. Internal claims police 
minority group boundaries by reinforcing belonging within the group. External claims 
attempt to protect the minority group from the political and economic decisions taken 
by the majority. Minority groups in Central and Eastern Europe have a need to 
employ both claims. On one hand, states often employ state-building policies that 
attempt to redirect identification towards the state and seemingly away from minority 
identification. Minority groups are right to be sceptical of ‘integration’. On the other, 
states are likely to represent the interests of the majority throughout the decision 
making structures, which may not discriminate automatically, but have potential to do 




Democratic institutions have the ability to include minorities within the 
decision-making process, which would ensure minority groups the ability to protect 
their own identities within the larger political community. The role of democratic 
institutions in protecting minority rights has been well discussed in the literature (for 
an overview, see Bellamy 2000), but our question here pertains more to what role 
international organizations have in shaping democratic institutions as a means of 
protecting the rights of minorities. Kymlicka (2008, 3-4) highlights that international 
organizations shape domestic debates about minority rights in two ways. First, 
international organizations are often at the centre of the diffusion of political 
discourse relating to the management of minority rights. He argues that this diffusion 
is often a conversation between international organizations, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and civil servants. Second, international organizations are 
involved in formulating minority rights provisions. Elsewhere, we have referred to 
this as ‘setting, implementing and expanding [minority rights] standards’ (Galbreath 
and McEvoy 2011). 
 
Norms  
The Council of Europe has been an active promoter of democratic standards in 
general and minority rights specifically in the post-socialist world. Accordingly, the 
Council of Europe illustrates how the rights-based and institutional approaches to 
minority rights are connected. At times, the Council of Europe has collaborated with 
the OSCE as it did when a Council delegation attended the 1991 Geneva Meeting of 
Experts on National Minorities. The Council of Europe’s best efforts at furthering the 
call for the protection of national minorities has been the Framework Convention, the 
outcome of the Committee of Ministers ad hoc Committee for the Protection of 
National Minorities.
4
 The 1995 document establishes a standard for national minority 
rights that have been replicated in the HCNM sponsored documents mentioned 
earlier. However, like many agreements on national minorities, the document does not 
go as far as to define the term. Indeed, as Wilson finds it is strange that the FCNM is 
‘the only binding multilateral treaty on minority rights, which makes no attempt to 
define to whom it applies’ (2000: 10). Nevertheless, the document does go as far to 
                                            
4
 See http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/157.htm (Date accessed: 26 August 2005). 
Background to the FCNM can be found at http://www.ecmi.de/doc/CoE_Project/intro.html (Date 
accessed: 26 August 2005). 
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establish a set standard for minority protection in Europe. The FCNM is important 
because it specifically applies to a subset of the larger human rights discourse. 
Furthermore, the document goes further than international treaties on human rights 
which partly pertain to linguistic and/or religious minorities. In the Framework 
Convention, we see a focus on protection and facilitation. Article 4, subsection 1 
focuses on protection alone: 
 
The Parties undertake to guarantee persons belonging to national minorities the right 
of equality before the law and of equal protection of the law. In this respect, any 
discrimination based on belonging to a national minority shall be prohibited.  
 
Article 5 addresses both protection and facilitation: 
 
1. The Parties undertake to promote the condition necessary for persons belonging to 
national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the 
essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions, and 
cultural heritage. 
 
2. Without prejudice to measures taken in pursuance of their general integration 
policy, the Parties shall refrain from policies or practices aimed at assimilation of 
persons belonging to national minorities against their will and shall protect these 
persons from any action aimed at such assimilation. 
 
Important for this study and our understanding of the European minority rights regime 
is that the FCNM further develops the ideas and norms associated with minority rights 
in Europe. 
The acceptance of the Framework Convention has not been whole-hearted by 
any means either in Western or Central and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, a 
considerable number of states have signed and ratified the FCNM. In fact, the 
acceptance of the Framework Convention was a condition for EU membership and 
was monitored in the European Commission’s Regular Reports as mandated in 
Agenda 2000. It is important to note that France has neither signed nor ratified the 
Framework Convention. Furthermore, many of the states that have accepted the 
FCNM have also attached declarations to the treaty. Estonia and Latvia are cases in 
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point. In Estonia, the FCNM came into force on 1 February 1998. When ratified, the 
declaration that accompanied the FCNM listed those groups that were considered 
‘national minorities’. The significantly large Russian-speaking community in Estonia 
was not listed, making a political point as to how the Estonian state saw this 
community in particular. Despite the leverage of the European Commission, Latvia 
signed but failed to ratify the FCNM before accession. The Latvian parliament 
delayed until June 2005 before promulgating the FCNM, although they too added a 
declaration listing who fell into the category of ‘national minority’ in Latvia. Once 
again, the Russian-speaking community was not listed (Galbreath and Muiznieks 
2009). These examples tell us something about the significance of the Framework 
Convention in Europe. The French have repeatedly stated that there are no ‘national 
minorities’ in France and thus the document does not pertain to them. The examples 
of the Estonian and Latvian cases illustrate that on some level it is important for states 
to at least rhetorically accept the document, while at the same time give some 
indication of the limitations of the FCNM by refusing to list the largest minority 
community as a ‘national minority’. Nevertheless, the rhetorical action of ratifying the 
Framework Convention by the large majority of Council of Europe member-states 




The Council of Europe is undeniably a ‘rights-based’ organization and one could 
argue that its ability to transform societal relations should be better than that of the 
OSCE. Two issues matter for states and their minorities. The first is that the Council 
of Europe is a legal institution and its most relevant agreement in relation to national 
minorities is a legal treaty. Detractors aside, the FCNM places states in a considerable 
legal context that allows individuals to present a legal case to the European Court of 
Human Rights, or at least those states that have signed and ratified it. Secondly, the 
Secretariat of the Framework Convention, the treaty’s governing and implementation 
body, can reference its own legal and normative framework as being part of the wider 
process of democracy and human rights. In this way, we see that the Council of 
Europe approaches societal security through a ‘constructive’ strategy.  
The FCNM for example attributes minority rights, or at least those of ‘national 
minorities’ which it fails to define, to the larger human rights legal framework. In this 
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way, the Council of Europe has constructed an alternative legal narrative of 
desecuritization. Yet, this approach too ascribes protection rather than empowerment 
in that the FCNM seeks to provide national minorities with equality under the state. 
And each state in turn is offered the ability to adapt these legal responsibilities to its 
own individual context, both in terms of institutions and minorities. By minorities, as 
we have seen, states have essentially designated which minorities they believe to be 
deserving of these rights of protection, which means that Russians in Estonia and 
Latvia do not qualify nor do Turks in Germany, despite the fact that these states are 
signatories to the FCNM. Finally, the Council of Europe’s approach illustrates the 
tensions between individual and group rights. Protection is easy to afford the 
individual since in most cases the individual is not threatening. Furthermore, we could 
argue that seeking equality for the individual can also be seen as empowerment, but as 
a minority, where does empowerment lie in the context of ‘emergency politics’? With 
the group. 
In other words, the Council of Europe’s ability to desecuritize societal 
relations is limited for the same reason as the OSCE. In essence, without transforming 
the zero-sum game of interethnic relations, we are unlikely to see significant changes. 
The same question can be said of the Council of Europe that we asked of the OSCE: 
why is it limited to this? The answer lies in the history of the Council of Europe as an 
organization that is meant to ‘lock-in’ democratic institutions and human rights, not 
transform them. Furthermore, the general logic of the European minority rights 
regime plays apart in that the Council of Europe is generally only able to ask, ‘Are we 
doing enough for minorities?’ rather than ‘Are we doing what we should for 
minorities?’ If the Council of Europe and its constructivist approach societal security 
is not able to transform interethnic relations, we should assume that the same cannot 




To investigate our third narrative, we explore the place of minority rights within the 
debates on European integration. A significant amount of literature on the accession 
process focuses on rationalist and constructivist arguments for enlargement.  
Rationalists argue, to put it simply, that enlargement was seen as a way of stabilising 
a transitioning region for both economic and political reasons: more trade, less 
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migrants and overall greater stability. Constructivists contend that in fact the interests 
of the existing member-states did not represent a strong desire to enlarge. For 
example, Schimmelfennig (2001) argues that many of the existing member-states 
were in fact hostile to enlargement. He finds that generally states who were either not 
bordering the candidate countries or net-receivers of EU resources, or both, were 
against enlargement. The United Kingdom was an exception to this trend, being 
neither. This constructivist argument finds that proponents of enlargement used 
rhetorical actions to persuade reluctant states by portraying accession as ‘Europe 
reunited’. Overall, we can see that there are elements of truth in both cases. Existing 
member-states did have an ‘interest’ in spreading market opportunities and political 
stability to the east. At the same time, countries such as France or Spain did require a 
persuasive rhetoric in order for them to at least not prevent enlargement. As Checkel 
(2001) shows, the difference between rationalist and constructivist arguments are not 
as great as once thought. 
While the interests of the existing member-states were complex, the interests 
of the candidate countries were more straightforward. First, all of the new member-
states would become net-receivers of EU resources and already the influx of funds 
from the TACIS and PHARE programmes had made a significant difference. In 
essence, the EU subsidised the political and economic transition in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The jury is still out on whether or not the EU, along with other major 
actors, have encouraged if not subsidised a social transition in the region. Second, the 
candidate countries in Central and Eastern Europe wanted to show that they were full 
members of the ‘West’ as well as modern Europe. Fifty years of Soviet hegemony had 
a political and social effect on the trajectories of post-socialist states. From a regional 
security point of view, we should expect that the post-socialist states would have 
chosen to band-wagon with the clear beneficiaries of the end of the Cold War (i.e. the 
‘West’), which is perhaps why we see such a strong overlap with EU and NATO 
enlargement.   
Finally, in the words of Andrew Moravcsik (2000), we can see that Central 
and Eastern European states were keen to ‘lock-in’ policies and structures that were 
perceived to contribute to a stable, democratic future, similar to the way that Western 
European states had done following the Second World War.. No doubt some 
candidate countries were more keen to implement recommended political and 
economic conditions than others. This is particularly highlighted in the case of 
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national minority protection. For example, Hungary was not only quick to implement 
Western standards of minority protection, but also to develop them further. This was 
Hungary’s own attempt to ‘lock-in’ policies to protect national minorities; not in 
Hungary itself, but rather in neighbouring states where there are Hungarian minorities 
(Tesser 2003; Williams 2002). The Hungarian government gambled that the pressure 
of reciprocity and Western influence would encourage its neighbours to follow-suit. 
Despite significant problems in Slovakia and Romania, protection for national 
minorities was eventually ensured. Other states, such as Estonia and Latvia, were not 
keen to implement further changes to domestic policies, with post-Soviet policies 
seeking to address the legacies of Soviet occupation. Milada Vachudova (2005) finds 
that other than Hungary, all of the candidate countries that were host to significant 
national minorities were reluctant to implement guarantees for national minority 
protection. She suggests that Central Europe can be seen in two groups based 
particularly on their policies towards national minorities with Hungary, Poland and 
the Czech Republic in one group and Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria in the other. 
The fact that by and far all of the candidate countries have ensured a certain standard 
of national minority protections confirms the importance of the EU, OSCE and 
Council of Europe for affecting such policy changes. 
 
Norms  
Existing literature on conditionality shows that the EU and in particular the 
European Commission has had the leverage to enforce commitments to international 
and European conventions for the protection of national minorities. In most cases, 
leverage was a product of offering the ‘carrot’ of membership. However, leverage 
also included the possibility for the ‘stick’ of delay (see Schimmelfennig et al. 2003, 
Kelley 2004) When it came to protecting minority rights in Central and Eastern 
Europe, the prospect for membership made a significant difference. For instance, 
changes in the minority rights legislation in Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia took place 
following the implementation of Agenda 2000 and the Regular Reports. For the 
European Commission, the annual Regular Reports were the principal instrument of 
communicating leverage on behalf of the EU. Pressure was heightened after 1997, 
with the formal beginning of the accession process (Tesser 2003). Likewise in Estonia 
and Latvia, pressure to change relatively conservative citizenship laws occurred in 
1997 and 1998 respectively (Aasland 2002; Gelazis 2003). As can be seen in the 
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OSCE High Commissioner letters and reports from the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe, EU membership was used as a rhetorical argument for reform. 
The EU’s Copenhagen Criteria (1993) set the standard for potential new 
member states. As well as focusing on political and economic transition away from 
the socialist model, the criteria also focused on the status of national minorities by 
calling on the ‘respect for and protection of minorities’. 5  However, the minority 
protection clause did not make it into the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty which would have 
made the statement part of the acquis communautaire. ‘Thus, the EU left out a 
fundamental legal basis on which to encourage the protection of minorities in 
potential new member-states’ (Galbreath 2005: 230). Nevertheless, the Amsterdam 
Treaty did contain a ‘Race Equality Directive’ which mandated the prevention of 
ethnic or racial discrimination. The directive did not come into force until 2003. 
Perhaps more importantly, the status of national minorities became increasingly 
important in the accession process which began in 1997 at the Intergovernmental 
Conference in Amsterdam which begot Agenda 2000.
6
 With the Amsterdam Treaty, 
the European Commission listed most countries that could formally become 
candidates for membership, although all of the prospective member-states had started 
their accession process much earlier. The list included the likely suspects: the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Estonia. 
Agenda 2000 not only set in motion the process of accession for those 
formally confirmed as candidates but also for others waiting in the wings. For proof 
we have the European Commission’s Regular Reports which covered each 
prospective member state. The Regular Reports were mandated by Agenda 2000 as a 
way of monitoring a country’s commitment to membership, using the Copenhagen 
Criteria as a basis. A review of the Regular Reports (1998) illustrates the European 
Commission’s continued focus on the status of national minorities. The rather 
complex case of Slovakia is a useful example of the Commission’s leverage. In 1998, 
the Regular Report on Slovakia stated: 
 
There has been no progress on the adoption of minority language legislation and no 
significant change in the protection of minorities.  
 
                                            
5
 http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm (Date accessed: 26 August 2005). 
6
 The accession process was again refined the following year at the Luxembourg European Council. 
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In spite of the commitments made to the EU and the OSCE High Commissioner for 
National Minorities and in spite of the Constitutional Court ruling of August 1997, 
which states that the non-existence of a law regulating the use of minorities’ 
languages is at variance with the Slovak Constitution, no significant progress has been 
made on this matter. 
 
The European Commission was particularly concerned about the use of minority 
languages in the public sphere. This concern related to the Slovak government’s 
‘titularisation’ of the educational system, even though a controversial language law 
had been defeated in the Slovak Parliament. By the 1999 Regular Report, the Slovak 
government had made ‘significant progress’ in the minority rights area. The Report 
noted: 
 
A Deputy Prime Minister for Human Rights, National Minorities and Regional 
Development who belongs to the Hungarian Coalition Party was appointed. 
Parliament established a Committee for Human Rights and National Minorities, 
including a commission for Roma issues. A Government Council for National and 
Ethnic Minorities, which has representatives of all the minorities, has been 
restructured as an advisory body to Government. Minorities units have also been 
created within the Ministries of Culture and Education and within the Office of 
Government. 
 
Despite remaining difficulties for the Roma community in Slovakia, policies towards 
other minorities greatly improved after 1999. Faced with a demanding European 
Commission on one side and an ‘external national homeland’, (e.g. Hungary), 
Slovakia was eventually induced to provide greater protection for national minorities.  
 There is evidence to be sceptical of how far the EU was willing to go to 
enforce minority protection in the candidate countries. James Hughes and Gwendolyn 
Sasse find that the European Commission’s attempts at monitoring events in Central 
and Eastern Europe contained many problems. They argue that ‘the Reports do not 
systematically assess the structure and operation of institutional frameworks or 
policies for dealing with minority groups’ (2003: 16). Yet a look at the Regular 
Reports shows that they consistently highlight the key issues and progress (or lack of 
progress) made by the candidate country. The excerpts taken from the Regular 
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Reports on Slovakia (1999) illustrate this point. Second, Hughes and Sasse find that 
the Regular Reports do not show transparency in how the European Commission 
came to their decisions. Hughes and Sasse are correct to point out that we should not 
assume that the information used to substantiate the conclusions for each country is 
the same. Furthermore, they are correct to highlight the varying standards by which 
the European Commission used to evaluate each country. Conversely, the role of 
national minorities in the various candidate countries was/is not the same and we 
should not expect the European Commission to see Poles in Lithuania in the same 
way as Turks in Bulgaria or Ruthenians in Hungary. Nevertheless, possibly there is 
something to the claim that the Regular Reports were not meant to stall the 
enlargement process. Yet this is hard to substantiate since all of the candidate 
countries for the 2004 enlargement did make progress in their protection of national 
minorities, even in cases where the states refused to recognise these groups as 
‘national minorities’ such as in Estonia and Latvia. Finally, we see that the Regular 
Reports for the current candidate countries have the potential to delay enlargement 
such as in the Western Balkans and Turkey. Although the EU could arguably have 
done more to support minority protection, the organization nevertheless deserves 
some credit, especially given the unwillingness of some existing members to engage 
with their own minority issues. 
 
Nannies 
 We have seen that no other organization has the same transformative power as 
the EU. Or at least, arguably, this was the case in the accession period. During the 
enlargement phase, the EU sought to replicate the Council of Europe by constructing 
a quasi-legal framework to influence societal relations. Here, we say ‘quasi-legal’ 
simply because the EU itself often, as stated, relied on norms set out by the OSCE, 
Council of Europe, and even at times the United Nations. Beyond a general reference 
to the protection of minorities in the Copenhagen Criteria, the EU had far fewer 
mechanisms by which to engage societal security. In this way, we can see that the EU 
went no further than the OSCE and its ‘desconstructivist’ approach or the Council of 
Europe and its ‘constructivist’ approach, which goes along way to supporting the 




 At the same time, we should expect some change following enlargement. Now 
that interethnic tensions exist within the EU not just on its border, surely we should 
see a change in the Union’s ability to engage with minorities. The answer is yes and 
no. Yes, the EU has been keen to make more robust its institutions responsible for 
human rights, such as the Fundamental Rights Agency, but this institution, like the 
Council of Europe, was established to protect the rights of individual citizens of 
Europe. Not ethnic groups. Where individuals of a minority are not allowed to vote or 
take public office, the Agency and even the European Court of Justice may become 
involved, although the European Court of Human Rights is more likely to hear the 
case. No, that as seen the EU still does not have a minority acquis, or a legal basis 
with which to deal with minorities either in terms of group protection or 
empowerment. The clearest institution in the EU for this was traditionally DG 
Enlargement, but this means less now that many of the relevant states are beyond 
accession.  
 So where does this leave the EU? Perhaps in a different place than the OSCE 
or Council of Europe despite its lack of legal rigour. In contract, the EU has far 
greater potential to employ the ‘reconstructivist’ approach to desecuritization. The 
narrative of regional integration is the key in that the project of ‘Europe’ is an 
alterative logic that the zero-sum game can be positively transformed into a positive-
sum game, as long as the perceptions of benefit and belonging are distributed as a 
relative gain at different political and societal levels. For instance, Romanians and 
Hungarians are part of a larger European ‘civilization’. Such a commonality could be 
the focus of a reconstructed narrative that ties in both groups (incidentally as it has). 
Furthermore, given the distributive nature of the EU as a multi-level governing 
organization, the EU has the greatest potential to push for empowerment over 
protection and move societal security from ‘emergency’ to ‘normal’ politics. 
 
Conclusion 
Following the end of the Cold War, Europe was once again faced with a resurgence in 
the securitization of societal identities in the form of ethnic politics and its more 
virulent conflict. European organizations sought to reduce these tensions to promote 
security, democracy, and European integration. Each of the three organizations has 
approached societal security differently, determined by its ‘narrative, norms and 
nannies’. The security narrative is best illustrated within the OSCE because it is the 
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one institution which has an explicit security agenda. In particular we can see this in 
how the HCNM has sought to desecuritize minority rights. This approach has sought 
to deconstruct the conflict by promoting nation-building and societal integration. The 
result is a failure to transform interethnic relations. 
Likewise, the Council of Europe has focused on the narrative of democracy 
and human rights in Central and Eastern Europe and its connection to minority rights. 
We illustrate how the Council of Europe focuses on minority rights in two ways. The 
first is the rights-based approach that carries forward the link between human rights 
and minority rights. The second way is the Council of Europe's struggle to reinforce 
democratic institutions to ensure that minority rights are protected. The Council of 
Europe has employed a ‘constructivist’ approach to societal security by attempting to 
protect minorities through a legal framework. Again, the result has been a failure to 
transform interethnic relations in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Finally, we see how European integration has shaped minority rights. Critics 
of the EU's power of conditionality or socialisation point to its weakness to influence 
policies on the ground in the area of minority rights. We argue that this was especially 
the case in the enlargement period where the EU employed a similar ‘constructivist’ 
approach as the Council of Europe. More importantly, we argue that the implications 
of this research and elsewhere (Galbreath and McEvoy 2012), the EU has the ability 
to reconstruct a mutually applicable narrative to societal security that can allow for a 
transformation in interethnic relations. 
In conclusion, we find that to date, European organizations are unable to 
transform interethnic relations, which probably tells us less about Slovakia or Latvia 
today, but more about the future of prospects in Kosovo or Georgia. These findings 
supports the limitations of the desecuritization of societal security set out by 
Huysmans and Roe. At the same time, the implications of Jutila’s ‘reconstructivist’ 
approach suggest that the EU has the ability to improve its transformative power. All 
of this is to suggest that international organizations have the ability to provide 
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